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Abstract
In	the	seminal	work	'An	Evolutionary	Approach	to	Norms',	Axelrod	identified	internalization	as	one	of	the	key	mechanisms	that	supports	the	spreading	and	stabilization	of	norms.	But	how	does	this
process	work?	This	paper	advocates	a	rich	cognitive	model	of	different	types,	degrees	and	factors	of	norm	internalization.	Rather	than	a	none-or-all	phenomenon,	we	claim	that	norm	internalization	is	a
dynamic	process,	whose	deepest	step	occurs	when	norms	are	complied	with	thoughtlessly.	In	order	to	implement	a	theoretical	model	of	internalization	and	check	its	effectiveness	in	sustaining	social
norms	and	promoting	cooperation,	a	simulated	web-service	distributed	market	has	been	designed,	where	both	services	and	agents'	tasks	are	dynamically	assigned.	Internalizers	are	compared	with
agents	whose	behaviour	is	driven	only	by	self-interested	motivations.	Simulation	findings	show	that	in	dynamic	unpredictable	scenarios,	internalizers	prove	more	adaptive	and	achieve	higher	level	of
cooperation	than	agents	whose	decision-making	is	based	only	on	utility	calculation.
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	Introduction
1.1 	Norm	internalization	has	long	been	studied	in	the	social-behavioral	sciences,	social	psychology	and	moral	philosophy	(Piaget	1965;	Kohlberg	1981).	By	'norm	internalization',	we	refer	to	the	process
that	transforms	the	motivations	of	agents	for	complying	with	social	norms	from	those	of	external	reward	or	punishment	to	that	of	following	norms	as	an	end	in	themselves	(Andrighetto	et	al.	2010b).
Consistent	with	Ullmann-Margalit	(1977),	we	consider	norms	as	prescribed	or	proscribed	ways	of	behaving	that	are	widespread	in	a	group	or	population.	We	claim	that	norms	influence	people	by
pushing	them	to	modify	their	mental	representations	and	form	new	ones	(Conte	et	al.	2013;	Andrighetto	et	al.	2010b;	Conte	&	Castelfranchi	2006).	Humans	may	decide	to	comply	with	norms	for	many
reasons,	such	as	external	or	internal	sanctions,	which	may	be	positive	or	negative,	the	legitimacy	of	the	normative	source,	or	because	"norms	should	be	respected"	(Kantian	morality).
1.2 	As	suggested	by	Axelrod	(1986),	norm	internalization	is	a	key	process	that	supports	norms	that	are	only	partially	established,	and	it	entails	several	advantages	for	maintaining	social	order.	One	is
greater	robustness.	Compliance	with	a	norm	is	generally	more	robust	when	a	norm	has	been	internalized	by	agents	than	when	their	compliance	is	solely	motivated	by	external	incentives.	Consider	that	if
everybody	in	a	population	internalizes	a	norm,	there	is	no	incentive	to	defect	and	the	norm	remains	stable	even	without	external	enforcement	(Gintis	2004a).	Moreover,	once	internalized,	individuals	in
many	circumstances	want,	and	influence,	others	to	observe	the	same	norms	that	they	do.	An	effect	of	this	is	that	norm	internalization	is	decisive,	if	not	indispensable,	for	achieving	distributed	social
control.
1.3 	While	the	importance	of	norm	internalization	as	a	promoter	of	social	order	is	now	widely	recognized,	some	fundamental	questions,	most	of	which	revolve	around	the	issue	of	the	proximate	causes,
remain	to	be	definitively	answered.	Why	and	how	do	people	internalize	social	inputs	like	commands,	values,	norms	and	tastes,	and	transform	them	into	endogenous	states?	Which	types	of	mental
properties	and	ingredients	must	individuals	possess	to	exhibit	the	multiple	forms	of	compliance,	from	fully	a	deliberative	choice	to	less	considered	or	even	automatic	ones?	What	are	the	specific
implications	of	different	forms	of	norm	compliance	for	society	and	its	governance?	These	questions	have,	so	far,	received	no	conclusive	answer.	In	particular,	no	explicit,	controllable,	and	reproducible
model	of	the	process	of	norm	internalization	within	the	mind	is	currently	available.
1.4 	The	present	work	aims	to	start	filling	this	gap,	by	(1)	sketching	the	building	blocks	of	a	cognitive	model	of	norm	internalization,	(2)	turning	it	into	a	simulation	model,	(3)	checking,	through	agent-based
simulation,	the	potential	of	our	cognitive	model	in	achieving	norm	internalization	and	(4)	observing	whether	and	to	what	extent	this	process	of	norm	internalization	affects	the	performance	of	a	group	of
agents.	The	central	purpose	of	this	paper	is	to	present	an	operational	model	of	the	internal	processes	and	mechanisms	of	norm	internalization.	We	identify	sufficient	conditions	for	agents	to	move	from	a
deliberative	cost-benefit	compliance	decision	to	one	in	which	they	pursue	norm	compliance	as	an	end	in	itself.	Far	from	depicting	norm	internalization	as	mindless	conformity,	automatic	execution	of	a
norm,	we	characterize	it	as	a	multi-step	process,	occurring	at	various	levels	of	mental	depth	and	giving	rise	to	more	or	less	robust	compliance,	and	describe	it	as	a	flexible	phenomenon	enabling	agents
to	de-internalize	it	and	retrieve	full	control	over	those	norms	which	they	previously	internalized.
1.5 	We	begin	by	identifying	the	set	of	mental	components	that	characterize	and	constitute	different	levels	and	degrees	of	internalization:	from	the	more	deliberate	to	the	more	automatic.	We	suggest	that,
while	sinking	in	the	mind	to	different	levels	of	depth,	norms	generate	and	activate	different	types	of	representations	and	mechanisms	that	can	gradually	lose	track	of	their	normative	origin	and	become
fully	endogenous	or	even	integrated	with	action	plans.	Thus,	norm	internalization	is	not	an	all-or-none	phenomenon,	but	a	multi-step	process	which	consists	of	degrees	and	levels	characterized	by
different	mental	ingredients	(see	Section	3).	Additionally,	norm	internalization	will	be	characterized	as	a	flexible	phenomenon,	allowing	norms	to	be	de-internalized,	automatic	compliance	blocked,	and
deliberation	restored	in	certain	circumstances	(Hassin	et	al.	2009;	Kennedy	&	Bugajska	2007).	Internalized	norms	are	not	inexorably	bound	to	remain	as	such:	under	extreme	conditions,	agents	may
retrieve	awareness	of	their	exogenous	source	and	of	their	external	enforcement.	Even	though	automated	responses	are	often	highly	efficient,	they	are	rarely	needed	all	the	time.	A	completely
automatized	response	may	become	counterproductive,	or	even	dangerous	in	some	cases.	When	certain	conditions	activate	inconsistent	prescriptions	a	given	routine	is	blocked,	allowing	agents	to	easily
adapt	even	to	dynamic	and	unpredictable	situations.
1.6 	Operationalizing	a	multi-step	and	flexible	model	of	norm	internalization	requires	a	versatile	agent	architecture.	The	modular	normative	architecture	EMIL-I-A	(EMIL	Internalizer	Agent)	is	a	good	candidate
for	this	undertaking	(Andrighetto	et	al.	2013;	Conte	et	al.	2013;	Andrighetto	et	al.	2010b).	It	is	an	agent	architecture	with	normative	mental	modules,	allowing	it	to	internalize	norms	and	to	block	automatic
normative	behavior	when	necessary.	A	key	feature	of	this	normative	architecture	that	allows	the	process	of	norm	internalization	to	take	place	is	agents'	ability	to	track	the	salience	of	a	norm;	they	are	able
to	measure	and	record	the	perceived	prominence	of	a	norm	within	a	group.	We	investigate	the	process	of	norm	salience	estimation	by	agents	and	contributing	factors.	A	proof-of-concept	simulation,
aimed	to	test	the	introduced	concepts	of	norm	internalization,	is	then	described.	Agent	based	simulation	helps	us	to	understand	the	internal	mechanisms	and	processes	of	norm	internalization	and	allows
us	to	test	the	effects	of	this	'deep'	form	of	norm	compliance	in	promoting	and	sustaining	social	order.	In	particular,	the	performance	of	EMIL-I-A	agents	are	compared	with	that	of	agents	unable	to
internalize	norms	and	whose	decision-making	is	based	on	self-interest	in	a	simulation	scenario	that	recreates	a	"Tragedy	of	the	Digital	Commons"	(Adar	&	Huberman	2000).	Results	show	that	in	a	social
dilemma-like	situation	agents	able	to	internalize	norms	in	a	flexible	way	achieve	a	higher	level	of	cooperation	and	adapt	better	to	new	and	unpredictable	situations	than	agents	whose	decision-making	is
based	on	self-interest	only.
1.7 	The	paper	is	organized	as	follows.	After	a	brief	overview	on	the	work	on	norm	internalization	in	Section	2,	we	will	present	our	theory,	focusing	on	different	types	and	levels	of	norm	internalization
(Section	3).	In	subsection	4.1,	the	EMIL-I-A	architecture	will	be	described.	In	subsection	5.3,	a	simulation	model	aimed	to	test	EMIL-I-A	in	a	social	dilemma	scenario	will	be	presented,	and	the	results	will
be	discussed	in	a	final	section.
Related	work
2.1 	In	recent	years,	an	interest	with	norm	internalization	has	reemerged	in	the	(computational)	social	sciences	and	in	the	evolutionary	game	theoretic	study	of	pro-social	behavior	(Bicchieri	2006;	Epstein
2006;	Gintis	2004b).	Joshua	Epstein	considers	norm	internalization	as	a	process	that	leads	to	automatic,	or	thoughtless,	conformity	(Epstein	2006).	In	his	view,	internalization	consists	of	learning	not	to
think	about	norms.	As	Epstein	argues:	'When	I	had	my	coffee	this	morning	and	I	went	upstairs	to	get	dressed,	I	never	considered	being	a	nudist	for	the	day'	(Epstein	2006).	Once	entrenched,	people,
observes	Epstein,	conform	to	norms	without	thinking	about	them.	The	more	often	they	have	taken	an	action	in	the	past,	the	more	likely	it	is	that	they	will	do	it	again	in	the	future.
2.2 	Although	interesting,	we	challenge	the	idea	that	internalizing	a	norm	makes	one	just	a	mindless	'norm-executor'	(Conte	2008).	Individuals	have	many	other	goals,	some	internalized,	that	constantly
compete	with	internalized	norms,	which	can	imply	that	sometimes	even	internalized	norms	are	violated.	It	could	happen	that	one	leaves	the	house	partially	undressed	because	of	an	emergency,	like	the
outbreak	of	a	fire.	Also,	a	highly	entrenched	and	ubiquitous	norm	like	that	of	truth-telling	is	violated	in	some	circumstances;	for	example,	when	the	damage	inflicted	by	the	truth	to	the	recipient	is	more
severe	than	that	caused	by	a	lie.	It	is	even	possible	to	regain	control	over	normative	actions	that	have	become	automatic.	For	example,	a	driver	stopping	at	the	red	light	might	see	a	policeman	asking	her
to	move	on.	In	such	a	case,	the	car	driver	needs	to	be	able	to	retrieve	control	of	her	action,	block	the	automatism,	and	decide	which	normative	input	should	be	given	priority.
2.3 	The	norm	internalization	process	has	several	advantages	for	generating	social	order,	such	as	increasing	compliance	and	distributing	norm	enforcement	and	spreading.	Individuals	who	internalize	norms
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are	not	only	much	better	at	complying	with,	but	also	at	defending	them	than	externally	enforced	individuals	are	(Gintis	2004b).	Once	an	individual	has	internalized	the	norm,	she	expects	it	from	herself
and	also	from	others.	However,	as	argued	by	Gintis	(2004b),	to	be	advantageous,	norm	internalization	must	also	be	flexible	and	allow	people	to	adapt	in	highly	unpredictable	and	rapidly	changing
environments.	The	faster	individuals'	goals	change,	the	likelier	it	is	that	they	adapt	to	a	dynamic	environment.	Hence,	the	higher	their	chances	of	survival	and	reproduction.	Norm	internalization	leads
agents	to	endogenize	certain	goals.	For	example	other-regarding	motivations,	which	had	less	time	to	evolve	through	natural	selection,	might	result	from	norm	internalization.
2.4 	We	are	sympathetic	with	the	explanation	provided	by	Gintis	of	the	adaptive	role	of	norm	internalization	and	the	necessity	of	the	flexibility	of	this	process.	This	work	is	aimed	to	model	the	internalization
process	not	as	mindless	conformity,	but	as	flexible	conformity	by	providing	an	analysis	of	the	cognitive	mechanisms	that	allow	norm	internalization	and	goal	altering	to	take	place.
A	multi-step	and	flexible	model	of	norm	internalization
3.1 	As	claimed	in	Section	1,	norm-internalization	is	the	process	by	means	of	which	agents	comply	with	norms	as	an	end	in	themselves	and	not	because	of	external	reward	or	punishment.	We	consider	it	as
a	multi-step	process	that	occurs	at	different	levels,	from	the	fully	deliberative	to	the	fully	automatic.	In	this	section,	we	sketch	a	preliminary	model	of	different	levels	and	degrees	of	norm	internalization
(Kennedy	&	Trafton	2007).	We	suggest	that	the	first	level	of	norm	internalization	consists	of	the	mental	process	that	takes	the	normative	belief	(a	belief	that	a	given	behavior,	in	a	given	scenario,	for	a
given	set	of	agents,	is	either	forbidden,	obligatory,	or	permitted)	and	provides	an	internalized	normative	goal[1]	as	an	output.	In	other	words,	the	normative	goal	is	no	longer	relativized	to	the	enforcement
normative	belief	(i.e.,	a	belief	that	normative	compliance	and	violation	are	supported	or	enforced	by	positive	or	negative	(informal)	sanctions)	but	is	now	endogenized,	i.e.,	it	has	become	an	end	in	itself,
needing	no	external	enforcement	to	being	complied	with.	When	an	internalized	normative	goal	is	created,	enforcement,	if	any,	is	self-administered	through	feelings	of	guilt,	self-deprecation,	loss	of	self-
esteem,	or	other	negative	self-evaluations	in	case	of	violations,	and	pride,	enhanced	self-esteem,	security,	or	other	favorable	self-evaluations	in	case	of	conformity	(Reykowsky	1982).
3.2 	As	normative	goals	sink	deeper	into	the	mind,	norms	gradually	lose	track	of	their	normative	origin	and	become	fully	endogenized.	At	an	intermediate	level,	the	norm	becomes	an	internalized	goal	of	the
agent.	The	normative	belief	may	still	persist,	but	the	agent	pursues	the	corresponding	goal	irrespective	of	it.	Consider	specific	dietary	regimes.	Initially,	an	individual	may	decide	to	follow	a	vegetarian	diet
for	ethical	reasons.	After	time,	she	may	come	to	strongly	dislike	the	taste	of	meat	and	continue	abstaining	from	eating	meat,	no	longer	for	ethical	reasons	but	for	satisfying	a	personal	goal.	Kingsley
(1949,	p.	55)	refers	to	this	level	of	norm	internalization	as	the	process	that	occurs	when:
a	norm	[...]	is	a	part	of	the	person,	not	regarded	objectively	or	understood	or	felt	as	a	rule,	but	simply	as	a	part	of	himself	[...]
3.3 	At	the	last	and	deepest	level	of	internalization,	no	decision-making	takes	place,	and	compliant	behavior	is	fully	automatic.	A	specific	perceived	event	triggers	a	conditioned	action.	For	instance,	stopping
when	traffic	lights	turn	red,	which	consists	of	a	sequence	of	movements	necessary	to	apply	the	breaks	-	a	behavioral	response	so	deeply	internalized	that	one	can	hardly	make	it	explicit.	At	this	level	of
internalization,	as	in	the	previous	one,	the	normative	beliefs	may	still	be	present	in	the	agent's	mind,	but	they	are	not	the	reason	why	she	applies	the	norm.	This	last	type	of	internalization	corresponds	to
what	Epstein	calls	thoughtless	conformity.	Other	authors	Tobias	(2009)	might	see	it	as	an	example	of	habituation.
3.4 	As	this	brief	taxonomy	shows,	there	is	more	than	one	form	of	norm	internalization,	and	each	of	them	is	characterized	by	a	specific	mental	configuration.	Moreover,	all	of	them	are	reversible.	Perceiving
that	a	norm	has	lost	its	salience	can	cause	the	de-internalization	of	the	normative	goal,	and	normative	conflict	can	make	an	individual	re-gain	control	over	an	automatic	action	and	refrain	from	applying	a
given	routine.
3.5 	Here,	we	present	a	normative	architecture,	EMIL-I-A,	that	accounts	for	the	first	level	of	norm	internalization.	It	explicates	the	mental	process	that	takes	a	norm	as	an	input	and	provides	an	internalized
normative	goal	as	output.	At	this	point,	the	internalized	normative	goal	is	endogenous	and	does	not	need	external	enforcement	to	ensure	compliance.	We	will	also	show	how,	in	certain	circumstances,
the	norm	can	be	de-internalized	and	the	norm-adoption	decision	restored.	The	remaining	levels	of	norm	internalization	will	be	the	object	of	future	inquiry.
Two	factors	favoring	norm	internalization
4.1 	In	this	section,	we	discuss	two	factors	that	can	favor	the	process	of	norm	internalization:	norm	salience	and	calculation	cost	saving.	Other	factors,	such	as	cognitive	consistency,	self-enhancing	effect,
self-determination,	emotions,	etc.,	have	been	identified	and	discussed	in	Andrighetto	et	al.	(2010b).	Here,	we	will	focus	only	on	norm	salience	and	calculation	cost	saving.	These	are	the	conditions	that
have	been	implemented	in	the	EMIL-I-A	agents.
4.2 	First,	we	suggest	that	highly	salient	norms	are	ideal	candidates	for	internalization.	A	norm	can	be	perceived	by	an	individual	as	more	or	less	prominent	and	active	within	a	group,	and	we	refer	to	this
perceived	value	as	norm	salience	(Cialdini	et	al.	1990;	Andrighetto	et	al.	2013;	Houser	&	Xiao	2010;	Bicchieri	2006).	Psychological	evidence	shows	that	the	more	salient	a	norm	is	perceived	to	be,	the
greater	its	impact	on	the	goal	to	comply	with	it	(Cialdini	et	al.	1990).
4.3 	The	importance	of	a	norm	is	one	of	the	factors	that	affects	the	perception	of	its	salience.	The	ability	to	monitor	variations	in	a	norm's	salience	allows	individuals	to	better	predict	the	actions,	expectations,
and	willingness	of	others	to	react	to	violations,	and	in	turn	adapt	their	own	behavior	to	others'	conduct.	Individuals	update	the	salience	of	their	normative	beliefs	and	goals	according	to	the	information	that
they	gather	from	their	social,	and	non-social,	environment	using	a	variety	of	cues,	of	which	others'	actions	is	one,	to	infer	how	salient	a	given	norm	is.	For	example,	the	amount	of	compliance,	the	efforts
and	costs	sustained	in	educating	the	population	to	form	a	certain	norm,	the	visibility	and	explicitness	of	the	norm,	the	credibility	and	legitimacy	of	the	normative	source	are	all	signs	by	which	people	infer
how	important	and	active	a	social	norm	is	in	a	specific	context	(Faillo	et	al.	2012;	Cialdini	et	al.	1990).
4.4 	As	claimed	in	previous	work,	the	way	and	the	degree	to	which	a	norm	is	enforced	also	plays	a	crucial	role	in	the	dynamic	of	its	salience	(Andrighetto	et	al.	2013;	Conte	et	al.	2013;	Andrighetto	&
Castelfranchi	2013).	If	properly	designed,	the	enforcement	mechanisms	can	have	both	a	coercive	and	a	norm-signaling	function.	To	make	this	distinction	more	vivid,	we	distinguish	between	two
enforcement	mechanisms,	punishment	and	sanction,	which	have	different	capacities	to	convey	normative	information.	Punishment	works	only	by	imposing	a	cost	on	the	'wrongdoer',	reducing	his	or	her
material	payoffs.	In	addition	to	inflicting	a	cost,	sanction	also	communicates	that	the	sanctioned	behavior	is	not	approved	of	because	it	violated	a	norm	(Galbiati	&	D'Antoni	2007;	Houser	&	Xiao	2010;
Masclet	et	al.	2003;	Giardini	et	al.	2010;	Sunstein	1996).	Sanctions	convey	a	great	deal	of	norm-relevant	information	that	has	the	effect	of	making	norms	explicit	and	increasing	their	salience.	To	deter
wrongdoers	from	future	violations,	punishment	relies	only	on	its	coercive	component,	while	sanction	combines	the	coercive	component	with	the	norm-signaling	one,	also	exploiting	the	motivational	power
of	norms.
4.5 	Salience	may	increase	to	such	a	degree	that	a	norm	becomes	internalized.	Conversely,	if	salience	falls	under	a	certain	threshold,	the	norm	ceases	to	be	internalized,	as	it	happens	when	people
perceive	violators,	indicating	that	the	norm	in	question	is	losing	importance	or	is	no	longer	operative.
4.6 	Second,	humans	are	parsimonious	calculators.	Under	certain	conditions,	norms	are	internalized	in	order	to	save	calculation	processing	and	execution	time	(Bicchieri	1990).	After	weighing	the	costs	and
benefits	of	complying	or	not	with	a	norm	a	certain	number	of	times,	each	time	reaching	the	same	decision,	individuals	stop	calculating	and	take	norm	compliance,	or	norm	breaking,	as	their	automatic
best	choice.	By	doing	so,	they	save	time	and	avoid	errors	that	lead	to	punishment.	Evolutionary	analyses	suggest	that	natural	selection	may	have	favored	the	internalization	of	norms	because	this
mechanism	saves	on	information	processing	costs	and	the	associated	errors	(Gintis	2004b;	Chudek	&	Henrich	2011).
4.7 	As	we	will	discuss	in	the	next	section,	EMIL-I-A	agents	are	designed	so	that	when	both	the	norm	salience	and	calculation	cost	saving	conditions	are	satisfied,	the	norm	is	internalized	and	the	normative
act	is	performed	automatically.
EMIL-I-A:	The	internalizer	architecture
4.8 	In	this	section,	we	present	EMIL-I-A	(see	Figure	1),	an	extension	of	the	EMIL-A	architecture,	that	includes	the	capacity	of	norm	internalization.	This	work,	to	our	knowledge,	is	the	first	to	provide	a
normative	architecture	that	is	able	to	orchestrate	the	processes	of	internalization	and	de-internalization	of	norms	in	a	dynamic	and	flexible	way	(see	also	Criado	et	al.	2010).	EMIL-A	is	an	agent
architecture	applied	to	the	simulation	of	norm	emergence,	innovation	and	spread.	It	is	a	cognitive	architecture	endowed	with	modules	that	allow	the	recognition	of	norms,	detecting	their	salience,
updating	it	and	deciding	whether	to	comply	or	not.	The	main	extensions	of	EMIL-I-A	compared	to	EMIL-A	are	the	introduction	of	a)	the	norm	salience	module,	b)	the	urgent	events	management	module,
and	c)	the	internalization	process.
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Figure	1.	The	main	components	of	the	EMIL-I-A	architecture	and	the	Urgent	Events	Management	Module
Norm	recognition	and	norm	adoption	modules
4.9 	The	Norm	Recognition	Module	allows	EMIL-I-A	agents	to	interpret	an	observed	behavior	or	communicated	social	request	as	normative	and	to	form	the	corresponding	normative	beliefs	and	goals	(see
Conte	et	al.	2013;	Andrighetto	et	al.	2010b;	Campennì	et	al.	2009)	for	a	detailed	description	of	how	the	norm	recognition	module	works).	After	exposure	to	the	normative	behaviors	of	others	and	to	their
explicit	or	implicit	normative	requests,	agents	potentially	acquire	those	normative	beliefs.	Normative	beliefs	consist	of	three	components:	1)	the	main	normative	belief,	stating	that	there	is	a	norm,	N,
prohibiting,	prescribing,	permitting	action	a,	2)	the	normative	belief	of	pertinence,	indicating	that	the	agent	who	holds	the	belief	belongs	to	the	set	of	agents	to	which	the	norm	applies,	and	finally	3)	the
norm	enforcement	belief,	stating	that	norm	compliance	and	violation	are	supported	by	positive	or	negative	(informal)	sanctions.[2]	In	order	to	motivate	agents	to	comply	with	it,	the	norm,	once	recognized,
has	to	generate	the	corresponding	normative	goal	in	the	agents'	mind.	Normative	beliefs,	because	of	the	Norm	Adoption	Module,	can	generate	normative	goals	as	a	means	to	avoid	punishment	and
obtain	rewards.	Before	internalization,	the	agent	must	calculate	the	costs	and	benefits	of	complying	with	or	violating	the	norm	in	order	to	decide	whether	to	observe	it	or	not.	But,	as	mentioned	before,
once	internalized,	this	cost-benefit	analysis	is	interrupted	and	the	norm	addressee	will	start	to	comply	with	it	independently	of	external	sanctions	and	rewards.
Salience	control	module
4.10 	In	previous	work	(Andrighetto	et	al.	2010a),	norm	recognition	heuristics	have	been	applied	to	scenarios	ruled	by	a	single	norm.	When	more	than	one	norm	is	in	force	(especially	when	there	are
conflicting	norms),	agents	need	a	way	to	discriminate	between	them	and	rank	them.	The	Salience	Control	Module	provides	EMIL-I-A	agents	with	the	ability	to	detect	the	relative	importance	of	each	norm
and	to	update	its	salience.	The	module	is	dynamically	fed	by	the	social	information	acquired	by	observing	and	interacting	with	the	other	agents.[3]
4.11 	Each	of	the	normative	cues	gathered	by	the	agents	(see	Table	1)	is	aggregated	with	different	weights.	Those	behavioral	or	communicative	acts,	such	as	acts	of	norm	obedience	(C,	O),	norm	invocation
(E)	and	norm	defense	(e.g.,	sanctions	S	or	punishments	P)	(	C,	O,	P,	S,	E),	that	are	interpreted	as	compliant	with	or	defending	a	norm,	make	its	salience	increase	(see	Table	1).	Violations	(NC)	and
unpunished	violations	(NPD),	on	the	contrary,	make	norm	salience	decrease,	signaling	that	the	social	group	is	losing	interest	in	that	norm	and	does	not	invest	in	its	enforcement.	The	values	and	the
ranking	order	reported	in	Table	1	have	been	extracted	from	Cialdini	et	al.	(1990).	[4]
Table	1:	Social	Cues	and	Weights	for	the	Norm	Salience	Aggregation	Function.	C	represents	the	self-normative	compliance	or	defection.	O	represents	the
normalized	number	(with	respect	to	the	total	amount	of	neighbors)	of	observed	norm	compliance	in	the	local	environment.	NPD	represents	the	normalized
number	(with	respect	to	the	total	amount	of	neighbors)	of	non-punished	defectors	in	the	local	environment.P	represents	the	normalized	number	(with	respect	to
the	total	amount	of	punishments	that	can	potentially	be	observed)	of	punishments	in	the	local	environment.	S	represents	the	normalized	number	(with	respect	to
the	total	amount	of	sanctions	that	can	potentially	be	observed)	of	sanctions	in	the	local	environment.	E	represents	the	normalized	number	(with	respect	to	the
total	amount	of	explicit	norm	invocations	that	can	potentially	be	observed)	of	explicit	norm	invocations	in	the	local	environment.
Social	Cue Weight
Self	Norm	Compliance/Violation	(C) wC	=	(+/-)	0.99
Observed	Norm	Compliance	(O) wO	=	(+)	0.33
Non	Punished	Defectors	(NPD) wNPD	=	(-)	0.66
Punishment	Observed/Applied/Received	(P) wP	=	(+)	0.33
Sanction	Observed/Applied/Received	(S) wS	=	(+)	0.99
Norm	Invocation	Observed/Received	(E) wE	=	(+)	0.99
4.12 	Norms'	salience	is	updated	according	to	the	formula	below	and	the	social	weights	described	in	Table	1:
where	Saltn	represents	the	salience	of	the	norm	n	at	time	t,	α	the	number	of	neighbors	of	the	agent,	φ	the	normalization	value	that	ensures	that	the	salience	value	does	not	go	below	0	or	exceed	1,[5]	w{C,
O,	NPD,	P,	S,	E}	the	weights	specified	in	Table	1,	and	finally	O,	NPD,	P,	S,	E	indicate	the	registered	occurrences	of	each	cue.	The	resulting	salience	measure	Saltn∈[0,	1]	(0	representing	minimum	salience
and	1	maximum	salience)	depends	on	the	social	information	that	each	agent	gathers	from	the	environment.	Since	every	agent	has	access	only	to	limited	information,	the	value	of	the	norm	salience	may
differ	from	agent	to	agent.
4.13 	The	norm	salience	measure	allows	agents	to	decide	which	mechanism	to	use	to	enforce	norms.	EMIL-I-A	agents	can	use	two	different	enforcing	mechanisms:	punishment	or	sanction	(see	Section	4).
An	agent	punishes	by	inflicting	a	cost	on	the	norm	breaker,	reducing	the	payoffs	of	the	punished	agent.	In	addition	to	inflicting	a	cost,	a	sanctioner	also	communicates	information	about	the	norm	that	has
been	violated.	The	initial	probability	of	inflicting	a	punishment	act	when	another	agent	is	observed	acting	against	norms	is	set	to	0.5	and	is	subsequently	negatively	affected	by	the	number	of	defectors.
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The	probability	of	sending	a	normative	message	(associated	or	not	with	punishment)	is	a	direct	function	of	the	perceived	salience	of	the	norm.	When	EMIL-I-A	recognizes	the	existence	of	a	norm,	then	it
uses	sanction	to	enforce	it,	instead	of	punishment.	The	probability	of	inflicting	a	sanction	increases	as	a	function	of	the	perceived	salience	of	the	norm.	Punishment	and	sanction	have	different	impacts
on	norm	recognition	and	salience	(see	Table1):	because	of	an	explicit	signaling	component,	sanction	is	more	likely	to	be	interpreted	as	an	act	enforcing	and	defending	a	norm	than	punishment.
4.14 	Moreover,	when	agents	have	the	belief	that	a	norm	is	highly	salient,	one	of	the	two	necessary	conditions	for	the	internalization	of	the	correspondent	normative	goal	(see	Sec.	4.1.4),	they	are	more	likely
to	internalize	the	correspondent	normative	goal.
4.15 	Once	a	norm	has	been	internalized,	the	salience	mechanism	remains	active	and	continues	to	monitor	the	changes	in	its	salience	value.	For	example,	if	the	salience	of	the	internalized	norm	decreases
after	a	certain	threshold,	the	normative	goal	will	be	de-internalized.	Even	though	the	computational	costs	for	norm	compliance	are	not	reduced	to	zero	(because	the	salience	mechanism	keeps	working),
they	are	substantially	decreased.
4.16 	The	Norm	Control	Salience	Module	is	a	key	feature	that	improves	agents'	performance	in	several	ways:	it	allows	EMIL-I-A	agents	to	dynamically	monitor	if	the	normative	scene	is	changing	and	adapt	to
it.	For	example,	if	norm	enforcement	suddenly	decreases	in	an	unstable	social	environment,	agents	with	highly	salient	norms	are	less	inclined	to	violate	them	than	agents	with	less	salient	norms.	Vice
versa,	if	a	specific	norm	decays,	EMIL-I-A	agents	are	able	to	detect	this	change,	stop	complying	with	it	and	adapt	to	the	new	state	of	affairs.	Considering	the	normative	decision	making	of	agents	as	a
rule	based	system,	the	norm	salience	module	enables	them	to	dynamically	modify	the	preference	order	of	these	rules,	scoring	the	more	salient	norms	higher	in	the	list.
4.17 	Finally,	when	facing	a	normative	conflict,	norm	salience	allows	the	agents	to	decide	which	action	to	perform,	providing	them	with	a	criterion	for	comparing	the	norms	applicable	to	the	context.	For
example,	the	agent	will	decide	whether	to	wait	or	move	on	the	basis	of	the	respective	salience	of	the	two	norms	"stop	at	red	traffic	light"	and	"clear	the	road	when	an	ambulance	comes	along".	Compared
to	rule-based	engines,	this	module	allows	the	temporal	insertion	of	a	higher	priority	rule	when	triggered	by	an	external	signal	(the	ambulance	alarm	in	the	previous	example),	leaving	the	other	rules
unattended	while	the	signal	is	active.
Urgent	events	management	module
4.18 	In	a	some	situations,	like	emergencies,	agents	must	be	able	to	recognize	the	situation	promptly	and	subsequently	break	a	norm.	By	this	means,	agents	can	decide	to	violate	a	norm,	for	example,
deciding	to	stop	at	green	traffic	lights	when	an	ambulance	with	its	sirens	activated	comes	along	at	high	speed	from	the	opposite	direction.	The	urgent	events	management	module	allows	EMIL-I-A	agents
to	manage	these	extreme	and	unpredictable	situations.
4.19 	In	the	present	model,	in	order	to	violate	norms	when	required	to	do	so	by	contingent	circumstances,	agents	need	to	explicitly	record	and	compare	the	situations	faced	(in	the	ambulance	example,	the
light	and	sound	of	the	sirens	cues	the	socially	appropriate,	and	desirable,	action	in	the	mind	of	the	driver,	despite	the	norm	cross	at	green	traffic	light).	All	the	Urgent	Events	are	assigned	a	salience	value
( )	that	agents	can	compare	with	the	salience	of	the	norm	regulating	the	situation,	and	decide	accordingly	(see	Figure	1).[6]	In	situations	classified	as	urgent,	the	decision-making	module
compares	the	degree	of	the	urgent	event	with	the	salience	of	the	norms	that	usually	regulate	that	situation.	If	the	salience	of	the	urgent	event	is	higher	than	that	of	the	norms,	the	agent	performs	the
action	associated	to	the	urgent	event.	Otherwise,	it	will	use	the	norms	to	decide	what	to	do.	The	salience	mechanism	allows	this	management	module	to	be	compared	with	an	adaptive	rule-based
system:	the	order	of	the	rules	dynamically	changes	according	to	the	salience	of	each	norm,	and	to	urgent	events	when	these	are	to	be	taken	into	consideration.
Internalization	process
4.20 	The	internalization	module	is	responsible	for	selecting	which	norm	should	be	internalized;	converting	it	into	an	internalized	normative	goal	that	is	fired	without	decision-making.	An	agent	can	internalize
only	one	norm	regulating	a	certain	situation	(e.g.,	people	greet	each	other	by	waving	from	a	respectful	distance,	by	a	friendly	handshake,	or	finally	by	kissing:	depending	on	the	environment,	only	one	of
these	three	actions	can	be	internalized).	Moreover,	because	of	the	information	provided	by	the	Salience	Control	Module,	this	mechanism	is	also	in	charge	of	the	de-internalization	process.
4.21 	EMIL-I-A	agents	are	designed	as	parsimonious	calculators:	under	certain	conditions,	they	internalize	norms	in	order	to	save	calculation	and	execution	time.	Upholding	a	norm	that	has	led	one	to
succeed	reasonably	well	in	the	past	is	a	way	of	economizing	on	the	calculation	costs	that	one	would	sustain	in	a	new	situation.	To	record	repetition	in	their	decision-making,	agents	track	(Evaln)	the
number	of	times	that	they	have	performed	this	decision-making	calculation	and	arrived	at	the	same	decision.	If	the	decision-making	calculation	returns	a	different	decision,	the	counter	will	be	reset,
representing	a	break	up	of	the	repetition.
4.22 	The	norm	n	is	necessarily	transformed	into	an	internalized	normative	goal	by	EMIL-I-A,[7]	when	both	the	following	conditions	are	satisfied:	(1)	the	salience	of	the	candidate	norm	is	at	its	maximum	value
(Saltn	=	1),	and	(2)	the	decision-making	calculation	has	returned	the	same	decision	a	certain	number	of	times	(in	the	present	model	we	fixed	the	calculation	repetition	tolerance	to	10,	therefore	Evaln≥10).
On	the	contrary,	a	norm	nx	is	de-internalized	when	the	following	conditions	apply:	(1)	the	salience	of	the	internalized	norm	decreases	to	its	minimum	value	(	Saltnx	=	0),	and	(2)	the	salience	of	another
norm	(ruling	exactly	the	same	type	of	interaction)	exceeds	the	internalized	one	(Saltny	>	Saltnx).	These	two	conditions	ensure	that	in	highly	norm-competitive	scenarios,	where	two	norms	have	similar
salience,	both	norms	are	not	continuously	internalized	and	de-internalize,	but	only	when	one	of	them	is	fully	overridden	by	the	other.	In	any	case,	these	conditions	should	be	tested	empirically	with
laboratory	experiments.
Self-Regulated	Distributed	Web	Service	Provisioning
5.1 	Our	simulation	scenario	is	a	web-service	market	populated	with	agents	whose	task	is	to	find	out	which	services	are	offered	by	other	agents	(distributed)	and	control	the	behavior	of	the	rest	of	their	peers
(self-regulated).	The	simulated	scenario	captures	fundamental	features	of	the	real-world	phenomenon	that	it	models:	it	is	dynamic	(new	services	with	different	capabilities	can	be	created	during	the
simulation),	unpredictable	and	populated	by	heterogeneous	agents.	To	test	the	performance	of	the	proposed	model	of	norm	internalization	in	a	multi-norm	scenario,	we	implemented	one	example	where
agents	are	regulated	by	two	possible	norms	and	an	urgent	event	may	regulate	the	situation	of	sharing	a	common	resource.	This	variant	is	a	novel	contribution	with	respect	to	previous	works	in	the
normative	self-adapting	community	(such	as	Blanc	et	al.	2005;	de	Pinninck	et	al.	2007).	The	presented	simulation	scenario	aims	to	represent	a	realistic	setting	while	reducing	the	number	of	variables	that
one	needs	to	define.	The	result	is	an	elementary	P2P	simulation	model	that	can	be	specified	for	different	interaction	protocols,	underlying	social	networks,	population	size,	exchanges	and	growing	rates,
etc.	The	exploration	of	these	parameters	and	their	relationship	with	real-world	phenomena	is	out	of	the	scope	of	this	work	and	remains	open	for	future	research.	At	this	stage	we	maintain	the	simplest
version	of	the	simulation	model	that	allows	us	to	test	the	implemented	internalizing	agent	architecture	and	compare	it	with	other	architectures.
Motivation
5.2 	The	presented	simulation	model	aims	to	reproduce	a	self-regulated	web-service	market.	Inspired	by	the	"Tragedy	of	the	Digital	Commons",	we	present	a	provider-consumer	scenario,	populated	by
providers	who	may	suffer	a	tragedy	of	the	commons	caused	by	consumers'	over-exploitation.	The	services	we	refer	to	present	the	following	features:	(1)	they	are	available	for	use	and	provide	utility	to
agents,	(2)	they	are	a	common	good,	and	(3)	they	can	only	handle	a	limited	number	of	requests	before	their	service	starts	loosing	quality.
5.3 	While	looking	for	services,	consumers	might	query	neighbors	in	their	social	network	about	who	can	provide	them	with	the	service	they	are	looking	for.	Social	networks	are	an	source	from	which	people
can	obtain	information	(given	their	topological	structure	reducing	the	distances	amongst	members	while	preserving	simplicity)	-	for	example	provided	by	word-of-mouth	-	and	represent	an	alternative
source,	with	respect	to	traditional	methods.	Conventional	approaches	in	multi-agent	systems,	such	as	registries	(centralized	repositories	that	store	information	used	for	matching	agents	offering	services
with	agents	needing	services)	or	matchmakers	(auxiliary	agents	that	have	the	information	necessary	to	couple	agents	offering	services	with	those	needing	them),	partially	address	the	problem	of	finding
service	providers	or	information	owners	(Decker	et	al.	1997).	In	highly	dynamic	environments,	however,	some	information	that	is	valuable	to	agents	cannot	be	stored	in	a	centralized	repository,	as	it
might	not	be	accessible	or	not	defined	functionally	for	design	purposes.	Such	information,	the	updated	details	about	the	quality	of	the	service	or	the	availability	of	the	service	for	instance,	may	be
accessible	only	through	social	networks.
5.4 	Here,	we	propose	a	hybrid	approach:	similarly	to	the	white	pages	in	UDDI	(Curbera	et	al.	2002),	our	agents	will	query	a	central	server	to	obtain	pointers	to	service	providers,	and	then,	all	other	important
information	about	the	service	will	be	provided	to	them	by	the	service	providers.	Our	system	functions	similarly	to	the	one	implemented	by	Napster	(2006).	More	specifically,	the	following	dynamics	occur
in	our	case	study.	Agents	learn	tasks,	or	look	for	and	find	services,	that	are	necessary	for	them	to	satisfy	their	needs.	Based	on	the	number	of	agents	using	it,	providers	supply	a	certain	quality	of	service
to	the	agent,	the	quality	of	which	can	increase	or	decrease	during	the	simulation.	Agents	obtain	the	services	that	they	need	by	finding	other	agents	who	are	willing	to	share	their	services.	For	the	sake	of
simplicity,	the	allocation	of	new	services	and	needs	is	done	automatically	by	the	system,	with	different	allocation	probability	distributions	depending	on	the	experiment	and	specified	accordingly	in	each
experiment	description.
5.5 	By	finding	a	service	that	fulfills	their	need,	and	which	is	of	an	adequate	quality,	agents	receive	a	reward.	If	the	quality	of	the	service	is	not	sufficiently	high,	agents	requesting	a	service,	requesters,	will
continue	their	search.
5.6 	The	service	is	a	resource	offered	by	an	agent	called	the	service	provider.	If	a	service-provider	decides	to	share	its	service,	this	is	automatically	shared,	becoming	accessible	at	that	same	moment	for
the	requester..	When	sharing,	a	service-provider	remains	blocked	for	a	number	of	time-steps	(representing	the	transaction	time),	thus	reducing	its	possibility	to	look	for	and	find	its	own	needed	service,
and	consequently	perform	any	interaction.	This	transactiontime	is	inspired	by	P2P	networks;	in	these	type	of	networks,	when	a	service	is	shared,	the	bandwidth	of	both	agents,	one	uploading	and	the
other	downloading,	is	reduced.[8]
5.7 	In	the	proposed	scenario,	purely	self-interested	agents	will	always	free-ride	and	use	the	services	provided	by	others	but	will	never	reciprocate	by	providing	their	own	services	in	return.	Widespread	self-
interested	behavior	leads	to	a	"tragedy	of	the	commons"	situation	in	which	a	depletion	of	the	shared	resources	occurs,	as	predicted	in	Adar	&	Huberman	(2000).
5.8 	Endowing	agents	with	the	EMIL-I-A	architecture	allows	them	to	behave	dynamically,	changing	the	rate	of	service	allocation	and	requests	across	time,	and	reflecting	the	performance	of	real	systems.	Our
aim	is	to	test	how	agents	with	EMIL-I-A	architecture	perform	when	facing	this	"tragedy	of	the	digital	commons"	situation	and	to	compare	their	performance	against	agents	endowed	with	different
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architectures.
Norms	in	the	Web	Service	Scenario
5.9 	As	previously	specified,	service	providers	can	share	any	of	the	held	services	with	a	requester.	However,	only	service	providers	know,	at	run-time,	the	quality	of	the	service	they	can	offer,	and	the	quality
needed	by	requesters.
5.10 	We	define	N	as	the	set	of	norms	in	our	Web	Service	Scenario	that	regulate	the	action	of	sharing	a	resource.	A	norm	is	specified	as	follows[9]:
5.11 	Similarly,	an	urgent	event	is	specified	as:
5.12 	Finally,	a	service	is	specified	as:
5.13 	In	the	algorithms,	we	access	the	different	elements	of	the	specification	structures	using	a	C	like	syntax.	For	instance,	if	we	have	the	norm	n,	we	can	access	its	antecedents	using	the	form	n.antecedents.
5.14 	There	are	two	different	norms	in	our	scenario,	a	single	urgent	event	that	regulates	the	sharing	of	a	generic	service	s,	and	three	possible	actions	of	agents	({Share_requested_service,
Not_allowed_to_share,	Do_not_share}).	The	first	two	actions	are	cooperative	behaviors	while	the	third	is	classed	as	a	defection.	The	difference	between	Not_allowed_to_share	and	Do_not_share	is	that
in	the	former,	there	is	a	socially	accepted	norm	that	prevents	the	agent	from	sharing	the	service	(in	the	benefit	of	the	society	that	imposes	that	norm)	while	in	the	second	it	is	the	agent's	self	interest	that
determines	that	it	is	better	not	to	share	the	service.
5.15 	The	first	norm	(N1),	"always	share",	is	a	norm	of	unconditional	cooperation.	The	second	(N2)	is	instructs	agents	to	"share	only	if	the	capacity	of	the	service	provider	has	not	reached	the	limit	to
guarantee	a	high	quality	service".	Finally,	the	"Urgent	event"	reflects	an	exceptional	generic	necessity	that	requires	the	service	to	be	shared.
5.16 	Depending	on	the	environmental	conditions	(the	service's	capacity	distributions,	in	this	scenario)	and	on	the	agents'	needs	(the	services'	expected	quality,	in	this	scenario),	one	or	the	other	norm	will
become	more	salient,	and	thus	govern	the	behavior	of	the	system.
5.17 	As	described	in	Section	4,	in	order	to	enforce	the	two	norms,	N1	and	N2,	and	to	deter	agents	from	violating	them,	EMIL-I-As	can	use	two	different	enforcing	mechanisms:	punishment	or	sanction.	The
initial	probability	of	inflicting	a	punishment	act	when	another	agent	is	observed	acting	against	either	N1	or	N2	is	set	to	0.5	and	then	it	is	negatively	affected	by	the	number	of	defectors.	Once	agents
recognize	the	existence	of	the	norms,	EMIL-I-A	agents	can	use	sanctions;	the	probability	of	inflicting	a	sanction	increases	as	a	function	of	the	perceived	salience	of	N1	and	N2.
Simulation	Model
5.18 	As	shown	in	Fig.	2,	we	employ	a	Hybrid	Decentralized	model	(as	defined	in	Androutsellis-Theotokis	&	Spinellis	2004)	in	which	each	agent	can	share	a	service	with	the	rest	of	the	network.	All	agents	are
connected	to	a	central	directory	server	that	maintains	(a)	a	table	in	which	all	the	users'	information	is	recorded	(typically	the	IP	addresses	and	the	connection	bandwidth,	which	in	our	system	are
represented,	respectively,	as	IDs	and	the	capacity	of	the	service),	and	(b)	a	table	listing	the	services	from	each	agent,	along	with	metadata	descriptions	of	the	services	(such	as	the	type,	capacity	and	so
on).	Each	agent	that	is	looking	for	a	service	sends	a	query	to	the	central	server.	The	server	searches	for	matches	in	its	index,	returning	a	list	of	users	that	could	supply	the	required	service.	The	user	can
then	open	direct	connections	with	one	or	more	of	the	peers	that	can	satisfy	the	needed	service.	The	final	decision,	taken	by	the	peers,	is	to	share	the	service	or	not.	Kazaa,	Gnutella2,	eMule,	and
bitTorrent	are	real	systems	that	use	this	specific	type	of	resource-exchange	P2P	environment.
5.19 	The	central	server	maintains	the	following	information:	Agents,	the	set	of	agents	in	the	system,	SN,	the	social	network	that	connects	the	agents,	and	T,	the	types	of	services	that	can	be	provided	and
looked	for	in	the	system.	The	complete	knowledge	of	the	social	network	is	a	strong	assumption	that	simplifies	the	object	of	our	research,	and	could	be	modified	in	future	versions	of	this	work.	Other
authors	have	applied	similar	approaches	to	P2P	networks	where	the	central	agent	does	not	posses	complete	knowledge	of	the	network	(de	Pinninck	et	al.	2007).
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Figure	2.	Social	Network	of	the	Web-Service	Provisioning	Scenario.
5.20 	Agents	are	located	in	a	social	network	that	restricts	their	interactions	and	communications.	The	social	network	is	described	in	the	following	way:
SN	=	⟨Agents,	Rel⟩	,
where	Agents	is	the	set	of	agents	populating	the	network	and	Rel	is	a	neighborhood	function.	The	neighborhood	function	is	symmetrical,	therefore	is	∀a,b∈Agents	if	Rel	(a,	b)	then	Rel	(b,	a).
5.21 	During	the	simulation,	agents	find	services	(or	learn	tasks)	that	are	offered	as	services.	Following	the	specification	in	section	5.2,	a	service	is	defined	as:
Service	=	⟨provID,	type,	clients,	capacity⟩
where	provID	represents	the	identification	number	of	the	service	provider	(e.g.	IP	address),	type∈T	is	the	type	of	service	offered	by	the	service	provider	(e.g.	storage,	calculation	time,	data	analysis),
clients	indicates	the	number	of	clients	currently	using	that	service	and	capacity	is	the	number	of	clients	that	a	service	provider	can	satisfy	while	offering	a	high	quality	service.
5.22 	Moreover,	agents	find	out	new	needs	that	can	be	fulfilled	by	obtaining	services	from	other	agents:
Needs	=	⟨a,	type,	quality,	deadline⟩
where	a∈Agents	is	the	agent	ID	for	which	this	need	applies,	type∈T	represents	the	type	of	service	an	agent	needs	with	a	minimum	Quality_of_Service	level	(quality),	before	the	deadline	that	is	fixed	to
100	time-steps	after	the	generation	of	the	request.	The	Quality_of_Service	of	a	provider	provID	is	calculated	in	the	following	way:
5.23 	For	the	sake	of	simplicity,	the	allocation	of	new	services	and	needs	to	the	agents	is	done	automatically	by	the	system,	with	different	allocation	probability	distributions	depending	on	the	experiment.
Moreover,	the	service's	capacity	and	expected	quality	follow	two	different	probability	distributions,	both	defined	by	the	system	and	dependent	on	the	environmental	conditions	that	will	be	simulated.	The
expected	quality	of	the	service	assigned	to	agents	is	fixed	and	cannot	be	changed	by	the	agents.	Moreover,	the	offered	quality	of	the	service	changes	dynamically,	depending	on	the	service	capacity	and
the	number	of	clients,	forming	a	linear	relationship	(the	more	clients	there	are	the	worse	the	QoS).
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Algorithm	1.	Simulation	process.
5.24 	The	simulation	is	run	for	20000	time	steps	[10],	and	each	time	step	is	structured	in	the	following	way:
1.	 According	to	the	environmental	situation,	each	agent	has	some	needs	to	satisfy	and	the	possibility	of	providing	services	(lines	2-14	in	Algorithm	1).	The	needs	are	only	assigned	to	an	agent
when	a	service	is	created,	and	that	is	why	we	assign	the	needs	after	the	creation	of	the	service.	The	new	service	is	created	with	a	random	type	and	a	random	capacity.[11]
2.	 Depending	on	its	most	urgent	needs	(i.e.,	those	with	a	shorter	deadline),	each	agent	asks	the	system[12]	for	a	needed	service	(line	18	in	Alg.	1),	thus	receiving	a	list	containing	potential	service
providers.	The	server	list	has	the	following	form	⟨a0,	d0⟩,⟨a1,	d1⟩,…,⟨ak,	dk⟩,	where	ai	represents	the	agent	identity,	and	di	represents	its	distance	from	the	requester.
3.	 The	selected	service-provider	is	the	one	nearest	to	the	agent	(line	19	in	Alg.	1)	and	it	is	requested	for	the	service	(as	it	can	be	seen	in	the	schematic	communication	protocol	shown	in	Figure	3)
with	an	urgent_event	parameter	(line	20	in	Alg.	1).
4.	 As	mentioned	before,	service	provides	can	take	any	of	these	three	decisions:	"Share_requested_service",	"Not_allowed_to_share"	or	"Do_not_to	_share".
5.	 If	the	response	by	the	service	provider	(received	in	line	20	of	Alg.	1)	is	positive	and	the	quality	of	the	received	service	is	at	least	equal	to	the	expected	one,	the	requesting	agent	receives	the
service.	This	agent	may	be	requested	to	provide	a	service	in	the	following	round,	itself	becoming	a	service-provider	(line	21-25	in	Alg.	1).	Both	the	original	service-provider	and	the	requester	are
occupied	for	a	number	of	time	steps	(representing	the	transaction	time	specified	by	contact.distance	in	Alg.	1)	If	the	quality	of	the	service	is	insufficient,	the	requester	will	continue	its	search.
6.	 Having	received	the	potential	service	provider's	response,	depending	on	the	response	and	the	requester's	normative	goal	(specified	by	norms	salience),	the	requester	can	decide	(in	line	26	in
Alg.	1)	to	punish	or	sanction	the	service-provider.	As	written	in	section	5.2,	punishment	works	by	imposing	a	fine	on	the	target,	modifying	the	cost-to-benefit	ratio	of	norm	compliance	and
violation,	while	in	sanctioning	the	fine	is	accompanied	by	a	normative	message,	making	explicit	the	existence	and	violation	of	the	norm	to	the	target	(potentially	to	the	audience	also)[13].
7.	 At	the	end	of	each	time	step	(line	29-32	in	Alg.	1),	agents	observe	the	interactions	that	have	occurred	around	them,	this	way	checking	the	amount	of	norm	compliance,	violation,	punishment,	and
sanction,	and	subsequently	update	the	norm's	salience	(as	explained	in	Sec.	4.1).	Our	agents	only	have	access	to	local	information;	they	can	record	only	the	normative	information	of	their	direct
neighbors	in	the	social	network,	although	the	information	that	they	receive	is	completely	accurate.
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Figure	3.	The	Interaction	Protocol	Between	Agents
5.25 	While	the	present	simulation	model	is	a	simplification	of	a	real	system,	we	think	that	it	is	endowed	with	the	necessary	ingredients	to	study	the	process	of	norm	internalization	in	a	more	realistic	scenario
than	a	classical	Prisoner's	Dilemma.	Another	simplification	of	the	present	model	concerns	the	normative	knowledge	held	by	the	agents:	they	know	which	actions	are	compliant	with	or	violate	which
norms.	This	assumption	dispenses	the	need	to	solve	problems	associated	with	ontology	alignment,	inter-agent	communication,	and	norm-representation	languages,	allowing	our	specific	object	of	study
to	be	focused.
Agent	Architectures:	EMIL-I-As	vs	IUMAs
5.26 	In	environments	where	the	designer	has	perfect	knowledge	of	both	the	system's	behavior	and	the	agents'	needs,	hardwired	strategies	are	the	best	option:	the	system	designer	can	use	scheduling
algorithms	to	synchronize	the	usage	of	the	services	amongst	the	agents	to	obtain	the	optimal	distribution.	However,	in	this	work,	we	are	interested	in	scenarios	where	the	dynamics	of	the	system	are
unpredictable	and	unfold	at	runtime.	Therefore,	we	need	agents	that	are	able	to	adapt	to	environmental	changes.	We	present	two	different	types	of	agents	whose	behaviors	are	contrasted:	IUMAs	and
EMIL-I-As.
IUMAs	decision-making
5.27 	The	decision-making	of	the	IUMAs	is	modeled	using	a	classical	reinforcement	learning	approach	(as	in	Villatoro	et	al.	2009;	Sen	&	Airiau	2007);	in	this	type	of	architecture,	the	cognitive	load	of	an	action
has	no	intrinsic	value	other	than	the	payoff	that	it	conveys.	Therefore,	IUMAs	are	unaware	of,	or	ignore,	their	norm-compliance	or	violations	and	only	know	which	actions	return	higher	payoffs.	Aiming	to
maximize	their	instantaneous	utility,	IUMAs	share	their	services	only	if	the	probability	of	being	punished	is	sufficiently	high.	Moreover,	these	agents	never	punish	as	punishing	is	costly	and	reduces	their
utility,	and	there	is	no	possibility	of	punishing	this	second-order	defection.
5.28 	The	IUMAs'	decision-making	for	the	first	stage	decision	is	modeled	with	a	classic	Q-Learning	algorithm	(as	in	Villatoro	et	al.	2009;	Sen	&	Airiau	2007).	The	learning	algorithm	used	here	is	a	simplified
version	of	the	Q-Learning	one	(Watkins	&	Dayan	1992).
5.29 	The	Q-Update	function	for	estimating	the	utility	of	a	specific	action	is:
Qt(a)←(1	-	α)×Qt-1(a)	+	α×reward (1)
where	reward	is	the	payoff	received	from	the	current	interaction	and	Qt(a)	is	the	utility	estimate	of	action	a	after	selecting	it	t	times.	When	agents	decide	not	to	explore,	they	will	choose	the	action	with	the
highest	Q	value.	The	reward	used	in	the	learning	process	is	the	one	obtained	from	interaction,	considering	also	the	amount	of	punishment	received.	In	order	to	follow	the	methodology	established	in
previous	work	on	social	learning	(Sen	&	Airiau	2007;	Mukherjee	et	al.	2007;	Villatoro	et	al.	2009),	in	all	the	experiments	presented	in	this	article	the	exploration	rate	has	been	fixed	at	25%,	i.e.,	one-fourth
of	the	actions	are	chosen	randomly.
5.30 	The	IUMAs'	decision-making	for	the	second	stage	is	also	modeled	with	Q-Learning.	However,	as	there	are	no	potential	risks	to	not	punishing	(as	in	the	meta-punishment	situation	presented	by	Axelrod
(1986),	agents	will	always	prefer	not	to	punish.
EMIL-I-As	decision-making
5.31 	The	second	type	of	agent	is	EMIL-I-A.	Its	decision-making	works	differently	before	and	after	the	internalization	process.	As	described	in	Sec.4.1,	EMIL-I-As	are	endowed	with	the	norm	recognition
module,	allowing	them	to	acquire	the	normative	belief	that	there	is	a	norm	and	the	enforcement	normative	belief	that	punishment	is	consequent	to	norm	violation.	Upon	recognizing	a	norm,	they	calculate
the	convenience	of	complying	with	it	or	not.	For	example,	if	a	norm	is	intensively	defended	through	the	application	of	punishments	or	sanctions,	EMIL-I-As	will	observe	it,	otherwise	they	will	violate	it.
5.32 	However,	they	do	not	know	beforehand	what	the	surveillance	rates	of	the	norm	are.	During	the	simulation,	agents	update	(with	their	own	direct	experience	and	observed	normative	social	information)	the
perceived	probability	of	being	punished.	Before	internalizing	a	norm,	EMIL-I-As'	decision-making	is	also	sensitive	to	a	risk	tolerance	rate:	when	the	perceived	punishment	probability	is	below	their	risk
tolerance	threshold,	agents	will	decide	to	violate	the	norm;	otherwise,	they	will	observe	it.	Although	this	process	may	provide	agents	with	the	highest	possible	benefits,	it	also	imposes	the	computational
cost	of	evaluating	each	of	the	options	at	every	every	time	step.
5.33 	Once	the	norm	has	been	transformed	into	an	internalized	normative	goal,	EMIL-I-As	can	avoid	this	cost-benefit	calculation:	they	will	observe	it	in	anautomatic	way.	Nevertheless,	the	salience
mechanism	is	still	active,	and	it	is	continuously	updated.	This	way,	if	necessary,	agents	are	able	to	unblock	the	automatic	action	and	to	restore	cost–benefit	analysis	in	order	to	decide	whether	to	comply
or	not.
5.34 	Initially,	only	norm-holders	know	about	the	norms	governing	their	environment.	Any	EMIL-I-A	can	(or	cannot)	be	a	norm-holder,	depending	on	whether	it	has	been	initialized	with	knowledge	about
norms	and	their	respective	salience.	How	the	initial	number	of	norm-holders	affects	the	performance	of	a	group	is	tested	in	section	5.8.
5.35 	EMIL-I-As	take	two	decisions:	(a)	whether	to	share	a	service	or	not,	and	(b)	whether	to	punish	or	sanction	norm	violators.	Concerning	the	first	choice	(see	Alg.	2),	to	share	a	service	or	not,	if	no	norm
has	yet	been	internalized,	the	agents	evaluate	all	the	available	actions	and	they	choose	the	one	returning	the	highest	payoff	(lines	13-32	in	Alg.	2).	Otherwise,	if	the	norm	has	been	internalized,	the
agents	behave	in	an	automatic	way:	the	decision	to	comply	is	no	longer	evaluated,	but	simply	executed	(lines	1-9	in	Alg.	2).	Agents	automatically	perform	the	internalized	norm	compliant	action	unless
an	urgent	event	request	arrives	(lines	10-12	in	Alg.	2).	In	Alg.	2,	Cooperation(Coop)	refers	to	the	norm	compliant	action	and	Defection(Def	)	to	the	norm	defecting	action.
5.36 	In	our	scenario,	an	urgent	event	can	only	happen	with	respect	to	the	second	norm	("Share	only	high	quality	services",	which	in	case	of	an	urgent	event	is	violated	sharing	services	with	any	quality).	We
can	observe	the	management	of	[urgent	events	in	lines	1-12	of	Alg.	2.[14]
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Algorithm	2.	Resource	Sharing	decision-making.
5.37 	In	Alg.	2,	internalized	(n)	is	the	function	that	returns	a	boolean	value	specifying	whether	the	agent	has	internalized	the	norm	n	andperceivedPunishmentProb(n)	is	the	function	that	returns	the	agent's
perceived	probability	of	being	punished	when	not	complying	with	the	norm	n.
5.38 	If	a	violation	is	detected,	a	second	decision,	whether	to	punish,	sanction,	or	do	nothing,	has	to	be	taken.[15]	The	result	of	this	decision	depends	on	the	salience	of	the	violated	norm.	This	decision-making
process	is	domain	specific	and	the	process	for	our	scenario	is	described	in	Algorithm	3.	The	cost	of	punishment	is	fixed	to	1:4,	meaning	that	punishment	costs	the	punisher	1	unit	while	reducing	the
target's	endowment	by	4	units	(the	1:4	punishment	ratio	is	used	because	it	has	been	found	(Nikiforakis	&	Normann	2008)	to	be	more	effective	in	promoting	cooperation).	The	decision-making	of	EMIL-I-
As	is	not	affected	by	the	cost	of	applying	a	punishment/sanction	to	the	target	(as	if	this	expense	was	to	be	considered	we	could	fall	into	a	second	order	dilemma,	as	expending	resources	is	never	rational
in	these	type	of	scenarios);	however,	the	costs	of	being	punished/sanctioned	affects	the	agents'	decision	to	cooperate	or	defect	in	the	next	rounds.
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Algorithm	3.	Decision-making	in	front	of	norm	violations
Experimental	Design	and	Research	Hypotheses
5.39 	As	previously	stated,	the	number	of	variables	in	this	simulation	scenario	are	minimized	and	we	change	only	those	that	can	directly	affect	the	decision	making	of	the	agents.	While	more	complex
simulation	scenarios	would	result	in	more	realistic	settings,	they	also	demand	further	developed	agent	architecture	and	interaction	protocols.
5.40 	To	reduce	the	search	space,	the	service	and	task	assignment	have	been	fixed	to	a	constant	rate	of	10%:	the	services	are	created	at	an	average	rate	of	1	every	10	time	steps,	and	at	that	time	step,	10%
of	the	population	will	be	assigned	with	tasks	that	need	that	service.	Tasks	are	assigned	only	when	services	are	created.
5.41 	Agents	are	located	in	a	scale-free	network	(that	represents	theoretical	social	networks	(Newman	2003;	Albert	&	Barabasi	2002).	This	topology	restricts	the	agents'	observation	window	(with	respect	to
the	social	and	normative	information)	to	their	direct	neighbors,	but	they	can	potentially	interact	(ask	and	receive	services)	with	any	other	agent	in	the	network.
5.42 	The	results	presented	in	this	section	are	the	average	results	of	25	simulations.
5.43 	All	non-IUMAs	agents	are	initialized	with	a	constant	propensity	to	violate	norms	and	the	perceived	probability	of	being	punished/sanctioned	is	equal	to	or	lower	than	30%.	At	the	beginning	of	a
simulation,	some	agents	(the	specific	quantity	varies	from	experiment	to	experiment)	know	the	existence	of	the	two	norms,	N1	Always	Share	When	Asked	For	a	Service	and	N2	Share	Only	High-Quality
Services.	We	refer	to	these	agents	as	norm	holders	and	the	initial	salience	of	their	norms	is	set	to	0.9.	The	simulations	are	populated	with	a	constant	number	of	50	agents,	with	a	variable	number	of
EMIL-I-A	(from	0	to	50)	(whether	or	not	norm	holders)	and	IUMA	(from	0	to	50)	agents.
5.44 	Before	proceeding	to	present	and	discuss	the	experimental	findings,	we	summarize	the	experimental	hypotheses	and	the	variables	that	are	manipulated	during	the	experiments.	The	main	hypothesis	we
test	is	that	in	a	social	dilemma	situation,	EMIL-I-As	achieve	higher	level	of	cooperation	than	agents	whose	decision-making	is	based	on	purely	utility	calculation	(IUMAs)	(see	Sec.	5.7).	Beside	testing	it,
we	are	also	interested	in	exploring	how	the	presence	of	norm	holders,	agents	that	know	which	norms	govern	the	environment	from	the	start	of	the	simulation,	affects	the	norm	internalization	process	(see
Sec.5.8).	Finally,	we	want	to	check	the	flexibility	of	the	EMIL-I-A	architecture	with	respect	to	its	ability	to	(1)	internalize	the	correct	norm	and	de-internalize	it	if	its	salience	decreases	(as	shown	in
Sec.5.6),	attending	also	to	local	conditions	(as	shown	in	Sec.5.9)	and	(2)	handle	emergencies	(as	shown	in	Sec.5.10).
5.45 	In	the	tragedy	of	the	digital	commons	scenario,	the	hypothesis	that	internalizers	outperform	self-interested	agents	in	obtaining	cooperation	is	tested	with	respect	to	the	number	of	the	successful
transactions	achieved,	as	shown	in	Sec.5.7.	In	a	population	of	50	agents,	varying	the	relative	numbers	of	EMIL-I-As	(from	0	to	50)	and	IUMAs	(from	0	to	50),	it	is	possible	to	observe	how	the	percentage
of	successful	transactions	changes	accordingly.
5.46 	The	effect	of	norm	holders	on	the	norm	internalization	process	is	tested	by	varying	the	number	of	initial	norm	holders	(from	0	to	50)	and	observing	how	this	change	affects	norms'	salience,	i.e.,	one	of	the
conditions	required	for	norm	internalization	to	take	place.
5.47 	Finally,	the	capability	of	EMIL-I-As	to	adapt	to	a	dynamically	changing	environment	is	tested	in	a	scenario	in	which	both	the	services	capacity	(from	infinite	to	3)	and	the	decided-quality	(for	low	to	high
and	vice	versa)	of	the	services	vary	during	the	simulation	(see	Fig.4(e)).
Experiment	1:	Adapting	to	Environmental	Conditions
5.48 	One	key	feature	of	our	internalizers	is	their	ability	to	dynamically	adapt	to	unpredictable	changes.	To	test	this	ability,	we	designed	several	dynamic	situations	in	which	the	providers'	capacities	and	the
requesters'	desires	vary.	From	the	beginning	of	the	simulation,	the	environment	is	fully	populated	with	EMIL-I-As	that	already	have	the	two	highly	salient	norms	stored	in	their	minds;	they	start	as	norm
holders.[16]
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Figure	4.	Different	Combinations	of	Resources	Capacities	Distribution	and	Expected	Quality	Distributions.	On	the	x-axis	the	time-steps	of	the	simulation	are	shown,	on	the	y-axis	the	amount	of	EMIL-I-
As	with	each	internalized	norm	is	indicated.
5.49 	First,	in	Fig.	4a	we	show	the	dynamics	of	a	basic	scenario,	where	the	services	are	endowed	with	infinite	capacity	to	attend	clients,	and	the	requesters	do	not	care	about	the	quality	of	the	services	they
receive	(meaning	that	also	services	with	a	low	quality	satisfy	their	needs).	This	type	of	experimental	setting	represents	an	hypothetical	world	with	infinite	services	and	low	maintenance	users.
5.50 	We	observe	that	after	a	number	of	time-steps,	the	internalization	process	starts	occurring,	leading	to	an	increased	number	of	agents	that	internalize	norm	1	(Always	Share	When	Asked	For	a	Service).
Why	is	norm	1	spreading	and	being	internalized	rather	than	norm	2	(Share	Only	High-Quality	Services)?	This	happens	because	in	this	experimental	condition,	agents	looking	for	a	service	are	not
interested	in	its	quality	thus	even	though	they	receive	low	quality	services	their	needs	are	satisfied	and	they	will	not	punish/sanction	the	service	provider.	Sharing	a	service,	whatever	its	value,	is
interpreted	as	an	action	compliant	with	norm	1	and	since	instances	of	this	action	exceed	the	number	of	actions	in	which	high	quality	services	are	shared,	the	salience	of	this	norm	is	higher	than	the
other's.	This	experiment	confirms	that	our	internalization	architecture	works	in	selecting	the	correct	(by	experimental	design)	norm	to	internalize.
5.51 	The	second	treatment	is	a	slight	but	important	variant	of	the	previous	one.	This	time,	the	services'	capacity	is	restricted	to	a	maximum	3	clients.	Results	in	Fig.	4b	show	that	agents	correctly	internalize
the	norm	that	rules	the	situation	(i.e.,	norm	1),	although	the	internalization	process	is	slower	than	in	the	previous	treatment.	The	reason	for	this	delay	lies	in	the	dynamics	taking	place	in	this	treatment:	no
clear	information	is	given	to	the	agents	for	deciding	which	norm,	norm	1	or	norm	2,	is	governing	the	system.	EMIL-I-As	are	initialized	with	both	norms	at	high	salience.	When	the	service	providers	start
sharing,	they	provide	requesters	with	high-quality	services,	even	though	the	requesters'	needs	would	also	be	satisfied	by	low-quality	services.	Agents	interpret	high-quality	transactions	as	actions
compliant	with	norm	2,	thus	increasing	its	salience	value.	After	a	while,	agents	start	sharing	services	of	lower	quality,	because	the	list	of	requesters	exceeds	the	amount	of	high-quality	services.	Low-
quality	service	transactions	make	the	salience	level	of	norm	2	decrease	and	the	salience	level	of	norm	1	increase	to	its	maximum	value	(a	necessary	condition	for	norm	internalization	as	shown	in
Sec.4.1.4).	We	can	observe	how	all	these	micro-dynamics	in	the	individuals	affect	the	global	behavior	of	the	system	producing	the	delay	shown	in	Fig.	4b.
5.52 	In	the	third	treatment	(see	Fig.	4c),	we	test	the	agents'	capacity	to	internalize	norm	2:	service	capacity	is	restricted	to	3	clients	and	the	requesters'	needs	are	satisfied	only	when	receiving	high-quality
services.	In	general,	we	observe	that	the	agents	that	internalize	norm	2	do	not	reach	a	majority.	When	they	do,	however,	they	reach	a	majority	quickly.	This	is	because	until	the	number	of	services	is
high	enough	to	satisfy	all	the	requests	with	their	expected	quality,	being	compliant	with	norm	2	can	be	interpreted	also	as	an	action	compliant	with	norm	1,	thus	maintaining	the	salience	of	norm	1	at	a
high	level.[17]
5.53 	In	the	fourth	treatment	(see	Fig.	4d),	a	dynamic	change	in	the	environment	is	included.	The	system	is	programmed	in	such	a	way	that	for	the	first	2000	time-steps	the	capacity	to	provide	services	is
infinite;	after	that	time,	during	the	simulation,	the	capacity	linearly	decreases	from	20	to	1.	Agents'	needs	are	satisfied	only	when	they	receive	high-quality	services.	We	observe	that	after	time-step	8000,
the	capacity	of	the	services	significantly	decreases	and	agents	slowly	start	to	de-internalize	norm	1	and	substitute	it	with	norm	2.	This	treatment	shows	how	our	agents	are	able	to	adapt	to	this	dynamic
situations.
5.54 	In	order	to	test	speed	of	their	adaptation,	we	designed	a	final	treatment.	In	Fig.	4e,	we	show	the	results	of	the	treatment	named	The	Complex	Loop,	in	which	we	can	observe	that	EMIL-I-As	perform
efficiently	even	in	a	complex	situation,	where	not	only	the	environment	(the	services	capacity),	but	also	the	agents'	preferences	(desired	quality	of	the	services)	change	during	the	simulation.
5.55 	The	Complex	Loop	treatment	shows	that	when	the	services'	capacity	is	infinite,	meaning	that	high-quality	services	are	always	available,	and	the	agents'	needs	are	satisfied	by	high-quality	services,	norm
1	is	internalized.	At	time-step	2000,	an	abrupt	change	occurs	in	the	environment,	making	the	services'	capacity	drop	to	3,	and	agents	switch	to	internalizing	norm	2.	After	time	step	5000,	agents'
preferences	change	(starting	now	to	be	satisfied	also	with	low-quality	services),	producing	another	change	in	the	internalization	dynamics.	Agents	return	to	internalizing	norm	1.	Finally,	agents'
preferences	change	again	at	time	step	15000,	preferring	high-quality	services	and	internalizing	norm	2	again.
5.56 	We	can	conclude	that	a	population	of	EMIL-I-As	can	adapt	to	sudden	and	unexpected	environmental	changes	in	a	flexible	manner,	selecting	the	correct	norm	to	internalize.
Experiment	2:	EMIL-I-As	vs	IUMAs
5.57 	In	this	experiment,	we	compare	the	performance	of	EMIL-I-As	and	IUMAs	using	a	number	of	simulations	and	treatments,	each	time	with	50	agents.	In	our	treatments,	we	vary	the	proportion	of	EMIL-I-As
and	IUMAs	in	intervals	of	10.[18]
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Figure	5.	Percentage	of	successful	transactions	with	different	proportions	of	IUMAs	and	EMIL-I-As.
5.58 	Figure	5	shows	the	percentage	of	successful	transactions[19]	that	occur	in	the	system	during	an	identical	situation	to	the	one	presented	in	the	"Complex	Loop"	experiment,	except,	here,	the	population	is
a	combination	of	EMIL-I-As	and	IUMAs.
5.59 	The	results	show	that	the	number	of	successful	transactions	is	proportional	to	the	number	of	EMIL-I-As.	Internalization	proves	effective	in	promoting	cooperation	even	in	complex	situations,	i.e.,	when
both	the	environment	(the	service	capacity)	and	agents'	preferences	(desired-quality	of	the	services)	change.	The	explanation	of	this	result	can	be	found	in	the	different	motivations	behind	the	decisions
of	IUMAs	and	EMIL-I-As	to	comply	with	norms.	When	IUMAs	share	a	service,	their	payoff	is	reduced,	as	sharing	prevents	them	from	taking	other	actions	for	a	number	of	time-steps,	and	therefore	they
decide	to	free-ride.	In	other	words,	they	always	ask	for	services,	but	they	never	share.
5.60 	On	the	other	hand,	EMIL-I-As	decide	to	comply	or	violate	the	norm,	not	only	to	maximize	their	material	payoffs,	but	also	because	they	have	recognized	the	existence	of	a	norm	ruling	the	scenario	and
then	they	generate	the	consequent	normative	goal.	Besides	mere	self-interest,	the	normative	goal	provides	EMIL-I-A	agents	with	an	additional	reason	to	comply	with	the	norm.	Consequently,	when	the
environment	changes	and	agents	need	to	find	out	the	new	norm,	EMIL-I-As	perform	a	certain	number	of	unsuccessful	transactions	before	properly	managing	the	new	situation.
5.61 	The	results	of	this	experiment	show	that	norms	are	important	for	solving	a	tragedy	of	the	commons	type	situation.	Moreover,	they	also	illustrate	that	to	be	effective	the	process	of	norm	internalization
needs	to	be	flexible	enough	for	agents	to	adapt	to	highly	unpredictable	and	rapidly	changing	environments.
Experiment	3:	Effect	of	Initial	Norm	Holders
5.62 	This	experiment	aims	to	analyze	how	the	initial	number	of	norm	holders	in	a	group	fully	populated	by	EMIL-I-A	agents	affects	the	performance	of	that	group.	As	explained	in	Sec.	4.1,	EMIL-I-As	do	not
know	which	norms	are	in	force	in	the	group	at	the	onset	of	the	simulation,	therefore	the	presence	of	norm-holders	who	explicitly	communicate	the	norms	is	necessary	for	triggering	the	process	of	norm
recognition.
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Figure	6.	Complex	Loop	Experiment	Average	Salience.	On	the	x-axis	the	simulation	time	is	shown,	while	on	the	y-axis	the	number	of	initial	norm	holders	(randomly	located	in	the	network)	is
indicated
5.63 	Focusing	again	on	The	Complex	Loop	experiment	(presented	in	Sec.	5.6	and	shown	in	Fig.	4e),	in	Fig.	6	the	average	norm's	salience	per	agent	is	shown.	We	obtained	similar	results	in	the	rest	of
experiments	performed	in	Sec.	5.6,	but	we	decided	to	focus	on	this	situation	because	of	its	complexity	and	completeness	(it	contains	all	the	possible	dynamics	of	our	scenario	with	respect	to	norm
internalization	and	de-internalization).	Figure	6a	represents	the	salience	dynamics	of	norm	1	and	Figure	6b	that	of	norm	2.	At	any	time-step	in	the	experiment,	only	one	of	the	two	norms	prescribes	how	to
ideally	behave.	We	can	observe	that	the	salience	of	both	norms	changes	according	to	the	changes	in	the	environment,	obtaining	a	higher	salience	in	the	norm	that	currently	applies	to	the	environmental
conditions.
5.64 	In	the	first	2000	time-steps	of	the	simulation,	the	number	of	norm	holders	has	a	substantial	effect	on	norm	salience.	As	the	number	of	norm	holders	increases,	so	does	the	norm's	salience.	Special
attention	should	be	paid	to	the	situation	with	no	initial	norm-holders;	here	norms	are	never	recognized	as	no	explicit	norm	elicitation	occurs	(by	explicit	norm	invocation	or	by	sanction).	Even	a	small
number	of	initial	norm-holders	(10%	of	the	population	in	this	case)	allows	agents	to	recognize	the	norms	and	internalize	them.	Once	recognized	and	stored	according	to	their	degree	of	salience,	agents
will	start	complying	with,	and	defending,	the	norms.	Thus,	norm	holders	are	necessary	for	triggering	a	virtuous	circle	from	compliance	with	the	norms	to	their	enforcement.	After	the	two	norms	have	been
recognized	(around	time-step	5000),	the	number	of	initial	norm	holders	no	longer	affects	the	successive	dynamics.	After	time-step	15000	(and	depending	on	the	treatment	conditions),	the	service's
capacities	and	agents'	needs	change	again,	also	leading	to	changes	in	the	salience	of	norms.
Experiment	4:	Testing	Locality:	Norm	Coexistence
5.65 	Given	that	each	agent's	norm	salience	is	updated	using	information	obtained	from	their	social	network,	network	topology	and	locality,	the	latter	determined	by	agent's	needs	and	services	conditions,
affect	norm	salience.	Consequently,	different	dilemmas	could	appear	in	different	parts	of	the	social	network,	depending	(again)	on	the	population's	preferences	and	environmental	conditions.	We	find	that
EMIL-I-As	are	able	to	cope	with	the	locality	of	the	norms,	allowing	the	coexistence	of	different	competitive	norms	in	the	same	social	network.	To	observe	this	result	we	performed	the	following
experiment.
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Figure	7.	Different	norms	coexisting	in	the	same	social	environment.
5.66 	We	placed	60	agents	on	a	one-dimensional	lattice,	with	neighborhood	size	set	to	6	(i.e.,	each	agent	has	a	constant	number	of	6	neighbors).	In	Fig.	7,	agents	in	the	top	right	and	in	the	bottom	left
quarters	of	the	ring	are	assigned	with	infinite	capacity	services	and	low-quality	desired	services	and	the	rest	of	the	agents	are	given	limited	capacity	services	and	high-quality	desired	tasks.	The	color	of
the	nodes	indicates	the	internalized	norms	(light	color	standing	for	norm	1,	dark	color	for	norm	2,	and	white	stands	for	no	norm	internalized).	The	self-adaptive	capability	of	EMIL-I-As	shows	a	good
performance	in	the	designed	environment:	two	norms	can	coexist	in	different	areas	of	the	same	social	network.
Experiment	5:	Dealing	with	Emergencies:	Selective	Norm	Violation
5.67 	One	of	our	claims	is	that	EMIL-I-As	are	able	to	unblock	a	norm	not	only	in	situations	where	its	salience	is	very	low,	meaning	that	the	norm	is	disappearing,	but	also	in	emergency	situations.
5.68 	While	IUMAs	cannot	handle	normative	requests	with	different	levels	of	urgent	event	(because	they	are	not	endowed	with	normative	architectures	that	can	keep	track	of	norms'	salience,	and	compare
them	with	explicit	urgent	requests),	EMIL-I-As	can	(thanks	to	the	salience	module).	In	the	ambulance	case,	the	siren	announces	an	emergency	that	is	more	salient	than	the	observance	of	the	norm	stop
at	the	red	traffic	light.	In	our	distributed	web-service	scenario,	we	can	imagine	the	following	situation.	One	of	our	agents	is	writing	a	scientific	paper	that	includes	a	number	of	important	calculations.
Unfortunately,	the	day	before	the	deadline,	the	agent	realizes	it	needs	to	rerun	some	simulation	experiments.	In	order	to	obtain	the	results	in	time,	it	needs	to	use	calculation	clusters	that	it	does	not
have	access	to	directly,	and	instead,	are	distributed	amongst	its	peers.	It	makes	requests	its	peers	accordingly	and,	in	response,	the	requested	agents	can	choose	to	follow	a	"first-in,	first-out"	norm	or,
given	the	urgent	situation,	make	an	exception	and	execute	the	calculations	of	our	last-minute	scientist.	It	is	easy	to	see	how	the	violation	of	the	first-in,	first-out	norm	by	its	colleague-neighbors,	benefits
our	agent.
5.69 	Experimental	results	show	that	the	EMIL-I-As	successfully	handle	emergencies	when	these	are	explicitly	specified	(as	the	siren	in	the	ambulance	case).	However,	there	is	a	cost	associated	to	this
advantage.	An	emergency	is	interpreted	by	the	audience	as	a	non-punished	norm-violation,	leading	to	a	reduction	of	the	norm's	salience	(stop	at	the	red	traffic	light).	If	agents	face	the	same	emergency
too	often,	the	salience	of	the	norm	"normally"	regulating	the	situation	will	decrease	and	this	reduction	will	unblock	the	internalization	process,	leading	the	agent	back	to	the	normative	(benefit-to-cost
calculation)	phase.	We	can	then	affirm	that	emergencies	can	be	managed	by	internalizers,	but	only	when	they	occur	sporadically,	otherwise	they	are	interpreted	as	a	change	in	the	salience	of	the	norm
governing	the	environment.
Summary	and	conclusions
6.1 	In	this	work,	we	have	presented	EMIL-I-A,	an	agent	architecture	for	internalizing	norms	that	is	designed	for	adaptive	systems.	EMIL-I-A	allows	for	a	balanced	trade-off	between	calculation	time	and
efficiency.	The	norm	salience	mechanism	plays	a	key	role	in	the	internalization	process.	It	works	as	the	conductor	orchestrating	the	process	of	norm	internalization	in	scenarios	where	more	than	one
norm	applies.	In	other	words,	norm	salience	allows	norm	compliance	to	synchronize	with	fluctuating	environmental	conditions	and	agents'	tasks,	thus	guaranteeing	a	successful	adaptation.
Advances	on	the	state	of	the	art
6.2 	What	is	the	value	added	of	the	work	presented	so	far	with	regard	to	the	current	understanding	of	the	process	of	norm	internalization?	First,	we	presented	an	operational	model	of	norm	internalization,
which	can	be	reproduced	and	computationally	tested.	Second,	we	presented	a	dynamic	model	of	norm	internalization	as	a	multistep	process,	demonstrating	the	relationships	between	norm
internalization	and	related	phenomena,	such	as	(semi)automated	behaviors	and	routines	or	habits.	Third,	we	showed	by	means	of	simulation	to	what	extent	and	under	what	conditions	norm
internalization	positively	affects	cooperation	in	a	group	of	agents.
6.3 	We	tested	EMIL-I-As	in	a	tragedy	of	the	digital	commons	scenario,	where	the	emergence	of	cooperation	is	a	difficult	task	to	achieve	and	they	were	able	to	successfully	deal	with	this	task.	The	simulation
data	show	that	when	facing	situations	in	which	the	environment	can	rapidly	change,	internalizers	are	able	to	adapt.	We	also	observe	that	the	amount	of	initial	norm	holders	and	EMIL-I-As	speeds	up	the
process	of	norm	convergence,	even	when	the	scenarios	are	dynamic	and	different	norms	have	to	be	internalized	and	de-internalized.
6.4 	A	fourth	interesting	result	achieved	concerns	the	subjective	character	of	norm	salience,	which	allows	the	coexistence	of	different	norms	in	the	same	social	environment:	depending	on	the	agents'
interests	and	the	environmental	conditions,	different	norms	can	emerge	in	the	same	environment.
6.5 	Last,	the	experiments	have	shown	that	our	internalization	architecture,	EMIL-I-A,	is	flexible	enough	to	handle	emergencies	and	decide	to	violate	an	already	internalized	norm.	We	claim	that
internalization	provides	agents	with	self-policing	capabilities	that	are	very	useful	in	settings	where	social	control	is	unfeasible	and	expensive.
	Future	Work
7.1 	As	Axelrod	Axelrod	(1986)	already	envisioned	in	his	work,	internalization	is	a	key	mechanism	for	norm	maintenance.	In	his	work,	he	explored	themetanorm	mechanism	in	a	simulated	scenario,	leaving
seven	other	mechanisms	(dominance,	internalization,	deterrence,	social	proof,	membership,	law	and	reputation)	experimentally	unexplored.
7.2 	The	experiments	presented	in	this	work	do	not	allow	us	to	claim	that	the	internalization	process	makes	agents	save	calculation	and	execution	time.	We	need	to	test	this	hypothesis	in	a	different
scenario.	Nonetheless,	our	intuition	is	that	the	automated	behavior	obtained	via	the	internalization	process	results	in	a	faster	execution	and	decision-making	time	with	respect	to	other	classical
deliberative	architectures.
7.3 	As	one	of	the	short	term	tasks	for	future	work,	a	new	scenario	in	which	the	norms	do	not	subsume	each	other	needs	to	be	found.	In	such	a	scenario,	we	would	be	able	to	obtain	clearer	results	about
how	the	adaptation	process	is	improved	thanks	to	the	salience	module	and	the	internalization	process.
7.4 	The	experimental	results	presented	in	this	work	show	that	internalization	performs	satisfactorily	in	self-regulated	web	service	provision.	So	far,	however,	we	have	designed	and	run	experiments	only
with	agents	that	all	desire	the	same	level	of	quality	for	the	requested	services.	In	future	versions	of	this	work,	we	will	address	heterogeneous	situations	(where	agent	requests	are	different,	and	therefore
different	norms	apply),	thus	tackling	dominance,	another	mechanism	pointed	out	by	Axelrod	(1986).	A	less	immediate	but	no	less	valuable	direction	for	future	work	is	the	modeling	of	internalization	as	a
continuum	from	deliberate	action	to	automatic	response,	in	which	interesting	combinations	of	both	types	of	behavior	might	be	explored	and	compared	in	terms	of	both	individual	and	social	utility.
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	Notes
	1We	refer	to	goals	as	internal	representations	triggering-and-guiding	action	at	once:	they	represent	the	state	of	the	world	that	agents	want	to	reach	by	means	of	action	and	that	they	monitor	while
executing	the	action.	In	particular,	a	normative	goal	is	a	goal	that	an	agent	happens	to	have	as	long	as	she	has	a	normative	belief	about	a.	In	other	words,	an	agent	has	a	normative	goal	only	if	she
believes	herself	to	be	subject	to	a	norm	(Conte	&	Castelfranchi	1995;	Conte	2009;	Miller	et	al.	1960).
2When	agents	recognize	a	social	input	as	a	norm,	its	initial	salience	is	fixed	to	what	we	refer	to	as	the	Norm	Activation	Value.	Then,	this	starting	value	is	dynamically	updated	step	by	step	depending	on
the	normative	information	gathered	form	the	social	environment.	As	it	is	shown	in	Sec.	4.1.2,	the	salience	value	of	any	norm	is	within	the	range	[0,	1].	Therefore,	the	specific	Norm	Activation	Value	within
the	simulation	is	0.5,	the	middle	point	between	the	minimum	and	the	maximum	salience	value.
3The	resulting	salience	measure	(Sal	?	[0,1],	0	representing	the	minimum	salience	and	1	the	maximum	salience)	depends	on	the	social	information	that	each	agent	gathers	from	the	environment.
4These	values	have	also	been	checked	through	a	cross-methodological	study	including	human	subjects,	see	Andrighetto	et	al.	(2013).
5This	value	is	generated	by	calculating	the	maximum	and	minimum	value	of	the	weighted	normative	cues.
6We	are	aware	that	associating	urgent	events	with	a	pre-defined	salience	value	is	a	short-cut	and	agents	should	learn	them	instead.	How	agents	learn	what	has	to	be	considered	as	urgent	will	be
explored	in	future	work.
7These	conditions	equally	apply	to	all	agents,	however,	each	agent	fulfills	them	at	different	moments,	because	norm	salience	is	subjective	and	updated	with	local	information	(C,O,NPD,P,S,E),	which
might	be	different	for	each	agent.
8The	main	intuition	for	the	incorporation	of	this	transaction	time	is	to	study	the	effects	of	homophily	(Val	et	al.	2012)	in	our	distributed	web	service	scenario.	However,	we	decided	to	postpone	that
http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/18/2/2.html 14 20/10/2015
research	and	in	this	work	to	focus	only	on	the	effects	of	norm	Internalization.
9The	purpose	of	this	specification	is	to	cover	the	necessities	of	this	example	while	keeping	it	as	simple	as	possible.	We	are	aware	of	the	extensive	literature	about	norm	specification	but	this	is	out	of	the
scope	of	this	article.
10This	amount	of	time-steps	has	been	chosen	according	to	the	experimenter	criteria	in	order	to	show	the	effects	of	the	internalization.	Because	of	agent's	decision	making	and	simulation	design,	these
time-steps	do	not	have	any	correlation	with	real	world	phenomena	timings.
11In	order	to	reduce	the	space	of	the	parameters,	the	ServiceAssignmentProbability	and	the	needAssignmentProbability	have	been	fixed	to	0.1.	In	future	versions	of	this	work,	real	data	will	be	extracted
from	available	data	sets	in	order	to	obtain	a	more	realistic	simulation	model.
12This	system	works	similarly	to	the	BitTorrent	(Zohar	&	Rosenschein	2009)	where	the	central	server	maintains	an	updated	list	of	service	providers.
13As	the	communication	of	norms	amongst	agents	is	out	of	the	scope	of	the	present	research,	we	have	assumed	perfect	communication.	This	implies	that	when	one	agent	decides	to	sanction	another,
the	normative	message	that	accompanies	the	monetary	punishment	is	equally	understood	by	both	parts	as	the	explicit	communication	of	a	certain	norm	without	possibility	of	misunderstanding.
14Without	the	Salience	Control	Module,	that	provides	salience	measures	for	different	norms,	the	urgent	event	management	module	would	not	properly	work	as	there	would	exist	no	way	to	compare	the
importance	of	an	urgent	event	with	respect	to	the	norms.
15As	we	said	in	Section	5.2,	only	agents	that	have	recognized	that	there	is	a	norm	regulating	their	group	will	sanction,	otherwise	they	will	just	use	punishment.
16As	we	will	see	in	Sec.	5.8,	the	internalization	process	speed	is	proportional	to	the	initial	amount	of	norm	holders.
17We	understand	that	in	this	scenario	there	is	a	relationship	between	the	compliance	of	Norm	2	and	Norm	1	which	might	difficult	the	analysis	of	the	experimental	results,	although	this	exemplifying
scenarios	should	be	use	for	the	understanding	of	the	dynamics	of	norm	internalization	and	de-internalization.
18As	in	the	previous	one,	in	this	scenario,	EMIL-I-As	are	also	norm-holders.
19We	consider	transactions	as	successful	when	a	service	provider	offers	a	service	of	the	requested	quality.
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